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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2A-3(2)(c) and § 7 8 - 6 - 1 0 ( 2 ) , Utah 
Code Annotated. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a trial and judgment in the 
Small Claims Court, Fifth Circuit, Sandy Department granted 
in favor of PIaintiff-Respondent and against 
Defendant-Appellant for damages resulting from an improper 
safety inspection by Appellant of a motor vehicle purchased 
by Respondent from a third party. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the purchaser of a motor vehicle may 
justifiably rely upon the representation in the form of 
safety inspection that a vehicle is in good working 
condition and conforms to Utah Highway Patrol regulations. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-164.5 Violation of chapter. 
Every person who commits, attempts to commit, 
conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of, 
any act declared in this chapter to be crime, whether 
individually or in connection with one or more other persons 
or as a principal, agent or accessory, shall be guilty of 
such offense, and eyery person who falsely, fraudulently, 
forcibly or willfully induces causes, coerces, requires, 
permits or directs another to violate any provision of this 
chapter is likewise guilty of such offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the trial court, the Judge heard testimony from 
James F l i n d e r s , Respondent and Leon Roper, Appellant. Mr. 
Flinders purchased a truck, but prior to purchasing the 
truck he wanted it inspected. He testified, "The truck was 
sold as is that's why I wanted it inspected. If it was 
rejected I could have had it repaired by the Dealer before 
it was purchased or I would not have bought it." At Mr. 
Flinders request, the truck was inspected on November 20, 
1986 by Leon Roper. Mr. Roper stated in his testimony that 
he gave the truck a quality inspection and that he followed 
the inspection manual. He further stated that both separate 
emergency cables were checked and they functioned as 
required. Mr. Roper also testified that he checked the 
tie-rods and wheels for movement. He further testified that 
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when the vehicle was inspected, it was getting dark and 
difficult to see, sometime just after 8:00 p.m. Mr. 
Flinder's name was placed on the inspection sticker because 
it was to be sold to him. Mr. Roper had never before met 
Mr. F l i n d e r s . 
Mr. Flinders stated that he purchased the truck 
two days after inspection and that the emergency brakes 
never worked. He also testified that the brake drums could 
not have been taken off, as represented by Mr. Roper, 
without backing the adjustment of the brake shoes. The 
adjustment had not been tampered with as evidenced by mud 
over the adjustment hole, and therefore, the drum could not 
have been removed to inspect the brake shoes. 
On the day following the purchase of the truck, Mr. 
Flinders left on a trip for Montana. Outside of McCammon, 
Idaho, the Respondent used the brakes to stop for possible 
engine trouble. The left rear brake locked up when the 
brakes were applied. After determining that nothing was 
wrong with the engine, and that the oil pressure light was 
faulty, Mr. Flinders attempted to drive away but the brake 
had locked up. To release the brake, he backed the vehicle 
a short distance and then continued his trip. 
Upon arriving in Montana, Repondent had the brakes 
inspected and immediately replaced. 
The Respondent also noticed unusual wear and tear 
on the tires and took the vehicle to a mechanic in Montana 
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who advised that the tie-rod ends needed replacement and an 
ali gnment done . 
The testimony indicates extensive work needed to be 
done to replace tie-rods and brake parts all within four or 
five days of the inspection. 
On return to the State of Utah, Mr. Flinders 
invited Earl Anderson from the Utah Highway Patrol to 
inspect the emergency brake cables. Mr. Anderson made a 
report, a copy of which was submitted to the trial court. 
Other documents in the form of receipts and affidavits were 
submitted to the Court by Mr. Flinders. These receipts and 
a f f i d a v i t s , which were returned to Mr. Flinders, are 
submi tted herewi th. 
Based on the testimony of both parties, the Judge 
made the following finding of fact: 
1. The vehicle was purchased after November 20, 
1986 by Mr. F l i n d e r s . 
2. On November 20, 1986, the truck was inspected 
by Mr. Roper who indicated that the truck passed inspection. 
3. There were problems with the vehicle which 
Flinders had checked out and repaired. 
4. Flinders has contacted the State of Utah 
respecting the problem. 
5. There was a report by Earl Anderson to the 
effect that there were some problems with the inspection. 
6. The inspection was improperly done which cost 
Mr. Flinders some money. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The Court must affirm the Judgment if there are any 
grounds apparent from the record which support the Judgment. 
The Respondent is a third-party beneficiary of the safety 
inspection. Alternatively, Seller acted as Respondent's 
agent when requesting the inspection. There is sufficient 
privity of contract between these parties. 
There is a warranty with every safety inspection 
that the vehicle complies with safety standards set by the 
Utah Highway Patrol. If an improper inspection is made, 
there is a breach of this statutory warranty. The contract 
between Seller and Buyer does not eradicate the warranty of 
quality safety inspection. 
The Court below disbelieved Defendants allegations 
of contributory negligence. There are also grounds for an 
award of damages based on a statutory offense by Defendant. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE JUDGMENT BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IF IT IS 
SUSTAINABLE UPON ANY PROPER LEGAL GROUND APPARENT FROM THE 
K T C M U T 
This Court must affirm the decision below if there 
are any grounds apparent from the record which would support 
the Respondent's position. The decision must be affirmed 
even if the basis for sustaining the ruling is not one upon 
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which the trial court relied. In Peterson v. Peterson, 645 
P.2d 37,39 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) , the Supreme Court stated: 
Here, there is an alternate basis for decision, 
which we apply pursuant to our rule that we will 
affirm a trial court's decision whenever we can do 
so on a proper ground, even though it was not the 
ground on which the trial court relied in its 
ruling. 
See also, Foss Lewis and Sons Construction Co. v. General 
Insurance Co. of America, 517 P.2d 539 (Utah 1 9 7 3 ) . 
If there is any proper legal ground which is 
apparent from the record, the judgment should be affirmed. 
Goodsel v. Department of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 
(Utah 19 ) . 
The trial court's decision is sustainable upon any 
of the following legal grounds, as will be argued hereafter: 
1. Breach of contract. 
2. Breach of warranty. 
3. Negli gence . 
4. Damages arising from a statutory offense. 
II. RESPONDENT IS A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY TO THE 
CONTRACT iniJrrN"TFEr^rLLFR"gF THE VEHICLE AND APPELLANT. 
From the record below, it is apparent that 
Respondent is a third-party beneficiary to the agreement for 
Appellant to conduct a safety inspection. The inspection 
itself was even done in the name of the Respondent, James T. 
Flinders. Although done at the request of the Seller, the 
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inspection was for the use and benefit of Respondent who 
would buy the vehicle if it passed inspection. 
A third party for whose benefit a contract is 
intended may enforce the terms of the contract. See 
Restatement 2d of Contracts, § 1 3 3 ( 1 ) ( a ) . The Supreme Court 
has stated, "[Where] performance of the promise satisfies or 
recognizes an actual or supposed duty of the promisee to the 
beneficiary, then the third party may still recover as a 
creditor beneficiary." Tracy Collins Bank and Trust v. 
Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) . 
In the case at bench, the Respondent is an intended 
third-party beneficiary and may enforce the contract. As a 
third-party beneficiary, there is sufficient privity between 
the parties to afford Respondent his cause of action. 
Ill, THE SELLER OF THE VEHICLE ACTED AS 
RESPONDENT'S AGENT TO OBTAIN THE VEHICLE INSPECTION. 
In addition to the argument that Respondent is a 
third-party beneficiary to the safety inspection, it can be 
equally said that the Seller acted as Respondent's agent 
when the inspection was obtained. 
The record shows that the Respondent requested that 
an inspection be done, and that the Seller went to Appellant 
to have the inspection completed. The inspection was done 
in the name of Respondent and there is nothing in the record 
which would contradict a conclusion of law that the Seller 
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acted as Respondent's agent in this particular matter. 
With Seller as Respondent's agent, there is 
complete privity of contract between Respondent and 
Appel1 ant. 
IV. PRIVITY OF CONTRACT IS UNNECESSARY AS A MATTER 
OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
In some situations, privity of contract is not 
needed to permit a party to litigate a contract right. 
Certain p e r s o n s , who voluntarily place themselves in a 
public r e l a t i o n s h i p , are held to their duty to the public 
even though there is no privity of contract. 
"Privity of contract is not necessary to establish 
the existence of a duty to exercise ordinary care 
not to injure another, but such duty may arise out 
of a voluntarily assumed relationship if public 
policy dictates the existence of such a duty." 
Berrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
456 P.2d 674, 686 (Cal . 1 9 6 9 ) . 
In that same case, the California Supreme Court 
outlined other situations when privity of contract is 
u n n e c e s s a r y , such as: 
1. A Notary Public who negligently fails to 
properly attest to a Will becomes liable to an intended 
beneficiary damaged because of the invalidity of the 
i n s t r u m e n t . 
2. An attorney who negligently drafts a Will 
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could be held liable to a deprived beneficiary. 
3. A lending institution who cooperates with a 
developer and shares in the control of a project becomes 
liable to buyers of improperly built homes. 
Id. 
Likewise, as a matter of public policy, one who 
holds himself out as a competent mechanic authorized to do 
safety inspections should be liable in either tort or 
contract to answer for any improper inspection that is made, 
whether there is privity of contract or not. 
±. A SAFETY INSPECTION IS AN EXPRESS WARRANTY 
THAT THE VEHICLE MEETS INSPECTION SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY 
UA¥7 
In his Brief, Appellant claims that there is no 
warranty. This is not the case, as there is an express 
statutory warranty. When the inspector places the sticker 
in the window, he warrants that the vehicle meets the 
minimum requirements of the Utah Highway Patrol Regulations. 
If the vehicle does not mechanically meet the regulations, 
and the inspector places a sticker in the window, there is a 
breach of that warranty. 
The circumstances of the case indicate, as found by 
the court below, that the vehicle did not conform to the 
regulations even though it was given a sticker. Within five 
days of the inspection, the vehicle's defects were 
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discovered by Respondent in Montana.* 
In his Brief, Appellant argues that no warranty was 
introduced as evidence in the trial. A careful review of 
the record shows that on numerous occassions the Utah 
Highway Patrol regulations were presented, such as brake 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s and the requirement to inspect the emergency 
brakes and wheels for abnormalties. 
A court is also entitled to use common sense and 
common knowledge in its decision. The Court can take 
judicial notice of the Utah Highway Patrol regulations. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , the "warranty" of this case is not a question 
of fact, but one of law. The facts of the case indicate 
that a safety inspection was not done in accordance with the 
law. From such findings of fact, the court below made a 
proper conclusion of law that the safety-inspection 
regulations were breached. 
The case cited by Appellant, Bi11i ngs Yamaha v. 
Rick Warner Ford, 681 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984) is 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e because the warranty involved was a factual 
issue which the plaintiff did not present. In the case at 
hand, the regulations were brought to the judge's attention, 
and simply because these regulations/laws were not read into 
the record should not preclude the imposition of this 
statutory warranty upon Appellant. 
The Appellant, in his testimony, stated that he 
^Appellant erroneously states that Mr. Flinder's sub-
sequent brake inspection occurred in Utah, when in fact, 
parts were purchased and most replaced in Montana on 
November 24 and 25, 1986. 
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gave a quality inspection, checking the tie rods and wheels 
for abnormal movement, and the brakes for unusual wear. 
Based on the ci rcumstanci al evidence, the trier of fact 
disbelieved Appellant's testimony2 and granted judgment to 
Respondent. 
A. Hearsay evidence was properly admitted. 
Appellant also argues that there was no non-hearsay 
evidence that the alignment parts were defective. This is 
not the case, as the Respondent had submitted a receipt for 
the parts which included, on the back, a notarized statement 
that the parts were bad. A receipt fits into hearsay 
exception Rule 8 0 3 ( b ) , and the notarized statements from the 
Montana Mechanics fit into hearsay exceptin Rule 804(a)(5) 
based on the unreasonableness of compelling such witnesses' 
a t t e n d a n c e . 
Additionally, hearsay exception Rule 801(1) 
applies: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
. . . (1) A statement describing or explaining an 
event or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
t h e r e a f t e r . 
Id. 
The statements presented as evidence were 
describing a condition while the declarant was perceiving 
the c o n d i t i o n . Such evidence was correctly introduced and 
accepted as a proper exception to the Hearsay Rule. 
2 M r . Roper also testified that when the vehicle was 
inspected it was getting dark and difficult to see, 
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B. The Uniform Commercial Code would not cause 
the exclusion of the Inspector's Warranty. 
Appellant argues that because the Seller sold the 
vehicle "As Is" then Respondent is precluded from enforcing 
the Inspector's Warranty. In Appellant's own case, Billings 
Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, Inc., 681 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) , 
such an argument is clarified. 
In Billings, there was an express disclaimer of 
warranties by the dealer. "As a matter of law, these 
disclaimers effectively limited plaintiff's remedy to the 
manufacturer's express warranties, discussed above. U.C.A., 
1953, § 70A-2-316. See_ Fry v. Puce Sporting Goods, Inc., 
Utah, 547 P.2d 1338 (1976)." U. at 1278. 
In other words, the "As Is" clause of a dealer does 
not erase prior warranties. The inspector cannot take 
advantage of a contract disclaimer when he is not a party to 
that contract and there is no privity.3 His warranty 
survived the disclaimer contained in the contract between 
the dealer and Respondent. 
The Appellant's nocturnal inspection of the vehicle 
was improper, and his placement of the sticker stands as a 
warranty that the vehicle met minimum safety regulations, a 
matter of law. He should be required to stand behind his 
representati ons. 
sometime just after 8:00 p.m. 
3See Appel1 ant' s Argument on privity, Argument I of 
Appel1 ant' s Brief. 
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Appellant argues that Mr. Flinders had a personal 
responsibility to inspect the vehicle. It would be 
extremely ludicrous to require that each person be 
responsible to re-inspect a vehicle to ensure that an 
inspector has properly done his job. The Appellant desires 
to shift the burden of a quality inspection upon the public. 
Appellant relied on a dissenting opinion for its 
position. His quote from W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders 
Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981) is njot the opinion of the 
court, but is a statement by the lone, dissenting judge. 
Much better to quote the majority: "The 
manufacturer should have a duty of exercising due care to 
avoid foreseeable harm to the users of his products." Id. 
at 45, quoting the Oregon Supreme Court. The inspector, 
too, has a duty of exercising due care to avoid foreseeable 
harm to the public resulting from his representation that 
the vehicle conformed to saftey guidelines. 
Finally, the Appellant claims that the safety-
inspection fee is "miniscule", and has "meager profit". No 
such evidence is before this Court, but it well-known that 
such an inspection may be done in about 20 minutes. At 
three inspections an hour, an inspector can make $27 per 
hour .4 
VI. APPELLANT-DEFENDANT FAILED IN HIS BURDEN OF 
PROVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-161(c)(2) 
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Contributory negligence is a question of fact. 
Deferance should be given to the trier of fact, who in this 
case did not accept defendant's contention that plaintiff 
was co-negligent in the damages suffered. 
U.C.A. § 78-27-37 et seq. does not impose a duty on 
a judge to "take into account'1 comparative negligence. This 
is an affirmative defense which must be raised by a 
defendant. If a trier of fact disbelieves a defendant, it 
does not have to consider comparative negligence. 
Appellant's blatent misstatement of the holding in 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Amoco Steel Co,, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
1979) is amazing. Appellant states: "The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that intentional misuse of a vehicle is a 
defense to a claim for personal injuries incurred from an 
allegedly-defective product under a 'strict liability' 
theory." Appellant then cites Ernest W. Hahn. 
The case is really about defective steel girders 
used at the Fashion Place Mall, which were allegedly erected 
out of piumb . 
The better case is Vernon v. Lake Motors, 488 P.2d 
302 (Utah 1971) which held: 
[I]f the Plaintiff knows of the defect and danger, 
but nevertheless "deliberately and unreasonably" 
goes ahead, he should be precluded from recovery." 
Id. at 305. 
In Vernon, the Plaintiff bought a new automobile, 
but had trouble with the windshield wipers which would not 
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shut off. The dealer in his hometown, Coalville, refused to 
honor the warranty issued by the Salt Lake dealer. Eight 
months after purchase, the problem still continued, and 
smoke began to emit from the dash. The Plaintiff then drove 
the vehicle to Salt Lake and en route the vehicle started on 
f i re. 
Even under these circumstances, the Court did not 
find any contributory negligence. Likewise, in this case, 
the Court refused to find contributory negligence. 
VII, THE JUDGMENT CAN BE AFFIRMED BASED ON 
APPELLANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
The essential elements of negligence are: (1) a 
duty of reasonable care owed by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation of 
injury; and (4) damages, D.C.R., Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 
663 P.2d 433 (Utah 198 3 ) ; Flowers v. K-Mart Corp,, 616 
P.2d 955 (Ariz.App. 1 9 8 3 ) . 
The record shows that there was a duty owed by 
Appellant to Respondent in contract and as a member of the 
general public. That duty was breached and damages were 
caused thereby. The judgment should be affirmed. 
VIII THE JUDGMENT CAN BE AFFIRMED BASED ON 
LIABILITY FOR A STATUTORY OFFENSE. 
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-164.5 imposes an offense 
on one who violates the chapter which includes the section 
on safety inspectors. Upon viewing the offense, the Court 
justifiably imposed a liability on the offender, and he was 
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ordered to repay Mr. Flinders for damages which arose. 
The lower Court's Order is correct. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's arguments rely on three cases, one of 
which was misstated; another from a dissenting opinion; and 
the third which has been distinguished. The Judgment should 
be affirmed, and the cots of appeal and attorney fees should 
be paid to Respondent by Appellant. 
DATED this 10th day of August, 1987. 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
B. Ray Zoll 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing PIaintiff-Respondent's Brief on this 10th day of 
August, 1987, postage prepaid. 
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NO RETURN ON ELECTRICAL PARTS 
R M S Al l accounts are due and payable by the 
th of the month fo l lowing purchase ^ 1 ' 0/{> f je r 
>nth f inance charge w i l l be idded to all past due 
:ounts This is an annual percentage rate of 18% 
* * * SPECIAL * t * 
ANJIFREEZE 3.99 
££IL.CMJJM 
PECFIVEO ay 
X 
ALL GOOOS HETuRNEO MUST BE ACCOMPANicO 3Y THiS iNVOICfc 
:T. NO SOLD TO 
Wd CASH SALE 
THANK YOU 
MACS HELPS KEEP 
THE BITTERR00T t 
ANTITY PART NUMBER 
1.00 RS-314R 
1.0Q RS-314R 
1. 00 62522 
1.00 7-1217 
3.00 705-1170 
i '0 TOTAw 61.22 M 3 
' 
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4 a\ 
FlME P U H O A i t OROlfi NO ATTENTION 1 
12'00 
wotcE rvpg
 w J t-%.. 
*-} Lh )SH SALE 
PRICE NET TOTAL 
RAY BRAK SET 52.400 34.900 34.90 
RAY CORE OEP. 
LiIC OIL SEALS 
NT HOSE ASEM , 
BK CLAMP 
0.00 0k 100 • '« 
11 000 11.00 
7 400 5.370 5.37 « . 
t3.230' 8.630" " 8.63 
0.690 O 4491 1. 32 
0.00 10TAL 
w 
61 22 
CODE J 
TiO 
no 
-no 
no 
no 
[ CASH\ 
Phone: 961-3155 
JERRY PAPPAS, Owner & Operator 
JERRY'S ALIGNMENT 
— FRONT END SPECIALIST 
BRAKES - SHOCKS - COMPUTER WHEEL BALANCING 
961 Old Corvallis Road 
Corvallis, MT. 59828 
BETWEEN WOODSIOE AND CORVALLIS ^ ^
 A ^ ^ t 
M.^ J A met F£IA/0S7?S . Z i p . 
Addr / O & JF/JfiLCS^ste^yoT 
at to, 199/p*** FBS *_.
 HQ. T&*'> 
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S*fip*itv Uniting 6e 
Front Side 
<fO Lytfv&t i T /y#y 6,6*0 c&e*<. 
: fiis^'.Mfc 
NOTAW PUBLIC for ths Slate. *f AAontajicj
 {s -.\ 
Residing at Hamilten/./AcpkifKi 
^ Gammittien Expir«» S«pt«wbfei 12, lS87t: 
Back S i d e 
• - , - ~ . ~ ^ ' T" J 
) ) 
»VGO£$!pE A^TO CENTErt .:,-
?T*'< 
:.sJ"a 
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soii»> ao.o. pHAH&q O N 
ACCT. 
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Back S i d e 
CORVALLIS AUTO PARTS 
P O BOX 496 
CORVALLIS, MT 59828 
(406) 961-3031 
CUSTOMER'S COPY 
22631 
SUB 
TOTAL 
T A X 
CUSTOMER SIGNATURE 
returned must be accompanied by this Invoice. TOTAL 
CORE CREDITS 
Any warranties/bq the parts and/or acces-
sories^ sold hereby ^m those made by the 
manufacturer The seller, as shown above, 
hereby \expressly disclaims all warranties, 
either excess or implied including ail implied 
warrantiesib^erchantefcihty or fitness for the 
particular purpo^er^nd the seller, as shown 
above neither assumes nor authorizes any \ 
other person to assume for it any liability in Jl 
connection with the sale of these parts and/or 
accessories NO RETURNS ON SPECIAL ORDERS OR ELECTRICAL PARTS AFTER INSTALLATION. 
Past due accounts are subject to a finance charge of 2% per month (24% on an annual basis). 
